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Short answer, Chitown, not enough evidence of sustainable health/durability. Ryan looked promising after tossing 132 innings in 2017. But then he threw fewer than 75 frames in both 2018 and 2019.
And he looked very solid pitching out of the MLB bullpen. For me, that’s his fit going forward. Could be a real high-leverage asset in relief.
I suspect that the answer, ChiTown, is that if the Cards went after a free agent, even if they got him, then they’d be over a barrel with a serious surplus of extremely expensive corner infielders. No leverage whatsoever, while trying to trade away Carpenter (or Goldy, theoretically).
What did you think of my trade idea?
Knizner plus an outfielder not named Bader, plus Matt Carpenter with a little salary relief included (say $3-5M per year), plus a modest but not inconsequential sweetener from the minor league pitching ranks like Kodi Whitley or Genesis Cabrera or Johan Oviedo.
I hadn’t given this much thought before, but the Cards could be a natural fit with the Rockies, because Colorado’s starting catcher Tony Wolters (a 27-year-old with 2.3 career WAR) slugged .329 in 2019, his backup was 36 years old, and their farm system is utterly backstop-bereft.
So Knizner to Colorado makes perfect sense as part of a swap. Yadi signs his one or two-year extension and Ivan Herrera becomes the next “catcher of the future.” Knizner plus an outfielder not named Bader, plus Matt Carpenter with a little salary relief included (say $3-5M per year), plus a modest but not inconsequential sweetener from the minor league pitching ranks like Kodi Whitley or Genesis Cabrera or Johan Oviedo, et Voila!
Since Dakota Hudson has become the de facto topic at this thread, this seems like a good place to rant.
Hudson was in my opinion one of the 25 or 30 best starting pitchers in the sport in 2019. Only 14 twirlers in all the major leagues threw as many innings with a lower ERA than Hudson. FIP can be a fascinating data point, but ERA describes reality and FIP is theory.
Dakota Hudson versus FIP, covering all of his professional performances exceeding 25 innings. (And using Clay Davenport’s version of FIP.)
2017 in AA, 2.53 ERA and 4.14 FIP
2017 in AAA, 4.42 ERA and 4.78 FIP
2018 in AAA, 2.50 ERA and 4.05 FIP
2018 in MLB, 2.63 ERA and 5.07 FIP
2019 in MLB, 3.35 ERA and 4.58 FIPOn average Hudson beat his FIP by 1.44 runs.
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But small samples can mislead. Let’s just look at the samples of more than 110 innings.
2017 in Double-A, ERA 1.61 lower than FIP
2018 in Triple-A, ERA 1.55 lower than FIP
2019 in the N.L., ERA 1.23 lower than FIPSo, using only the largest sample sizes, he beats his FIP by an average of 1.46 runs. Now, is that the professional profile of someone with a specific repeatable set of skills? Or someone who gets incredibly lucky over and over and over? The former feels more likely than the latter to me.
Stealing from a different thread:
In 2014 and 2015 college pitcher Dakota Hudson threw just 17 innings each year. Then in 2016, with that paucity of major college pitching experience, he nevertheless dominated college baseball as a starting pitcher in the toughest conference, which resulted in his being drafted in the first round.Then in 2017 he dominated Double-A. Won the ERA crown and was Pitcher of the Year in his league. In 2018 he dominated Triple-A. Lowest ERA for anyone with 100+ innings, and again Pitcher of the Year. And then in 2019 he enjoyed conspicuous success as a starting pitcher in the major leagues. Why is a pitcher with this resume still dismissed by a great many people as some sort of fluke?
Lastly, I believe Hudson was (understandably) overshadowed by Jack Flaherty’s historic second half of the season in 2019. Dak wasn’t Jack, but he was much tougher over the second half than the first — and especially during the final couple of months. In August Hudson allowed a .193 batting average and a .600 OPS. In September he permitted just a .163 average, and a .602 OPS.
That career arc taken as a whole, and that finish, that final couple of months, both suggest to me a terrific pitcher just scratching the surface of his talent.
“But then there are Marco Gonzales, Weaver, Alcantara, Hudson and Flaherty to potentially help balance it out. The organization has had a lot of top 100 pitching talent in the last decade…”
Well said, Brian. And Lance Lynn and Zac Gallen and Jordan Hicks as well. Although of course none of them ever even made the back end of anyone’s top 100 list. And by the by, Dakota Hudson never made the top 100 at MLB Pipeline or Baseball Prospectus. Or Keith Law or Fangraphs, I’m sure, since they both pegged him as a reliever.
As Brian implied, during the Mozeliak decade-plus, the Redbird pitching prospect outcomes overall have probably matched if not exceeded the industry-wide expectations. Here’s a dirty little secret about prospect lists: if all prospects were evaluated exactly right, there’d be guys ranked in the top 100 who only wind up with a handful of career WAR. Like 5 or 6 WAR for their entire careers.
Here’s a rough guideline for how their careers would actually shake out, if all minor leaguers were placed on a top 100 list with flawless foresight.
Top 8-10 prospects, 60+ WAR and the Hall Of Fame.
Next 10-12 prospects, 30+ WAR, Hall Of Very Good.
Next 12-15 prospects, 20-30 WAR. Cool rule of thumb is the “20/30 Law.” A prospect ranked 20th should accrue ~30 career WAR, and one ranked 30th should accumulate 20 career WAR, give or take.
Next 15-20 prospects, 12-18 WAR.
Next 20-30 prospects, 8-12 WAR.
Rest of the top 100, about 4-6 WAR.———————————–
We hear “top 100 prospect!” and we think a guy will be at least an above average regular, or mid-rotation starter, or longtime closer. But that’s more like top 50 and up. If not top 40.
“No one knows if he can correct his problems until he plays.”
Exactly, GC. The best managers know they have to play the great fielders even when they’re slumping at the plate, so the bat can develop. And even in the seasons when those bats are wet noodles — which naturally leads to a LOT of frustration from fans — the players still nevertheless contribute at an average-or-better overall rate, thanks to tremendous glovework.
In 2019 Shildt to his credit stuck with Wong when he had a dreadful sub-600 OPS for a two-month stretch. LaRussa stuck by Yadi when he didn’t hit as a young player, and Herzog did the same with Ozzie, not unlike Earl Weaver with Mark Belanger. There were no precisely calibrated “advanced metrics” needed to tell those latter managers how valuable their glovemen were. They just knew it.
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“Once his bat cooled as the league figured him out, the 2019 version just might be the guy he is going forward. Unfortunately, it’s a story we’ve seen before from Grichuk, Piscotty, etc.
Can you talk me off this ledge, Bob? What makes Harrison different?”Since you specifically referenced Grichuk & Piscotty, stl25, let’s look at them, and see what we see. As I’m sure everyone here recalls, they were both terrific hitters as rookies in 2015, then drastically declined afterwards. So we don’t want Bader to be like them. Right?
Well, maybe not right. Because Grichuk and Piscotty, taking only their seasons after 2015, have actually come pretty darn close in MLB to their upper minors hitting performances.
Grichuk in AA and AAA combined to post an average wRC+ of 109. From 2016-2019 in over 2,000 plate appearances he has an even 100 wRC+. Not a huge dropoff, from 109 to 100.
Piscotty in AA and AAA combined to post an average wRC+ of 115. From 2016-2019, also in just over 2,000 trips to the plate, Piscotty has a 110 wRC+. So the performance has been fine, really. Our expectations were skewed by the crazy 2015 seasons — just like Tommy Edman’s fluky 2019 at the major league level, after a mere 108 wRC+ in both AAA in 2019 and AA in 2018.
So again, Grichuk & Piscotty, not including their fluke 2015 debuts, have performed just a little worse at the plate than they did across Double-A and Triple-A. You know what Harry Bader did in AA/AAA? A combined wRC+ of 127. If he comes within 25 points of that he’s Lorenzo Cain, i.e., a star.
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If Bader does become an annual 80 wRC+ guy I would be shocked and very disappointed. But the thing is, and this is the hard part to accept as a fan, right now his defense and baserunning are of such surpassing quality that even at that dismal level of batting he’d still be a 2.5 to 3 WAR player if given 140-145 starts.
“Just look at what the team could look like heading into 2022:
C – Knizner, Molina
1B – Goldschmidt
2B – Edman, Sosa, Wong (FA after 2021)
SS – DeJong
3B – Montero, Mendoza
OF – Carlson, Thomas, Bader, Williams, O’Neill
SP – Mikolas, CMart, Flaherty, Hudson, Reyes, Gomber, Helsley, Cabrera, Woodford
RP – Gant, Brebbia, Hicks, Gallegos, Ponce de Leon, Fernandez”“Bottom line for me is that is not an elite roster. It could be a good roster capable of 90 wins but we will need help from the outside to get back to 95-100 wins.”
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First, thanks for taking the trouble to put that lineup/roster together, Forschy. I do lean toward gscott’s view though that it’s a very good (but not great) assemblage.
Looking at ways for the 2022 team to be an improvement on the 2019 squad, I think it has to come from the position player side. The 2019 pitching staff posted a cumulative 112 ERA+, and it’s a lot to ask for them to improve meaningfully upon that.
How do teams break through to greatness — and stay there for more than a year or two? I believe it’s pretty much one thing, and we all know what that is. Stars.
The deceptively straightforward pathway to an elite 2022 (and beyond) team is for one of Dylan Carlson, Nolan Gorman, or Ivan Herrera to emerge as a 6-WAR superstar — the 15-1 longshot option — or two of them to be 4-WAR stars. The likeliest thing in my opinion is that one of them becomes a borderline star, one a solid regular, and one a bench guy. But even that could be enough for a true talent 95-win team, provided Dakota Hudson* keeps improving, and one from among Angel Rondon, Matthew Liberatore, and Zack Thompson becomes a mid-rotation stalwart. But look at me, I’m already dreaming unfairly about better pitching!
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*Quick recap. In 2014 and 2015 college pitcher Dakota Hudson threw just 17 innings each year. Then in 2016 he dominated college baseball, as a starting pitcher in the toughest conference, which resulted in his being drafted in the first round. Then in 2017 he dominated Double-A. In 2018 he dominated Triple-A. And then in 2019 he enjoyed conspicuous success as a starting pitcher in the major leagues. Why is a pitcher with this resume still dismissed by a great many people as some sort of fluke? I’ll tell you why. In poker it’s called: think long, think wrong.
The problem with ANY offer for Arenado, is the length(s) of his contract.
Two years isn’t enough. (The opt-out possibility.)
Seven years is too much. (Profound decline is a real threat.)The sweet spot for a guy Arenado’s age would be 4 or 5 years for a long term contract. And no matter what, the Cards would be getting a contract multiple years different from that. On top of which, Busch III has been rough on righty power hitters. That doesn’t help.
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This should be in a different thread, but how about:
Liberatore and Fowler for Mookie Betts. Cards eat all but $7M of this year’s Fowler salary, and Sawx pay all of next year.Boston shaves $20M off their 2020 player payroll, which apparently is a big deal for them. And they get an excellent young prospect quite familiar to the new baseball chief, Chaim Bloom.
Cards add $20M to this year’s payroll, which apparently is a big deal for them. But StL ownership is okay with that, since they also instantly add five freaking wins and become significant favorites for the division crown. Sorry for usurping the Arenado thread.
Thanks very much for doing all of that legwork, CJ. I was a little surprised to see Carlson so far ahead of the field — but as you noted, Harry Bader’s defense doesn’t get much credit from the KATOH projection model.
As a companion piece to your research, I checked the cumulative Davenport Mean projections for the next two years for a large cast of outfielders, pro-rating their seasons to 600 plate appearances each. Again, this is for the next two seasons with full playing time:
Harrison Bader 8.4 WAR
Randy Arozarena 8.2
Lane Thomas 6.8
Justin Williams 6.2
Marcell Ozuna 6.2
Nick Castellanos 6.2
Dylan Carlson 5.8
Tyler O’Neill 4.8
Dexter Fowler 3.9Taking these numbers at face value, there’s obviously no way for the Cardinals at this snapshot in time to justify signing either Ozuna or Castellanos. Athough each of them has a very solid outlook, and would be a smart addition at small dollars for most any other organization.
And also bear in mind gentle readers that even if Arozerena is really this good (he probably isn’t), the dropoff to other Redbird flycatchers just isn’t that precipitous.
Lastly, if Dylan Carlson’s projection feels overly modest, remember he’s just turned 21. Davenport has him peaking at 4.7 WAR in the 2025 season. (Edit: Davenport tinkers with the numbers on a regular basis, and Carlson’s next two years have been downgraded to 5.4 WAR, but his single-season peak has been increased to 5.1 wins above replacement.)
“Fill in the blank, Ryu kinda looks like a long blond haired ______________”
Macy’s parade balloon? Baby LeRoy? Hideki Irabu?
“For whatever reason, I thought Miller just looked a lot better than his stats showed.”
I can understand that. He was a very specific kind of bad pitcher in 2019. Could be very good for a couple of weeks at a time, or even more. But then terrible. Terribler than anyone else in the pen. Home runs at the worst of possible times, hit batters, free passes.
(Edit: Now that I look more closely, Miller’s year was even more schizo than I thought. Awful in April & September, but surprisingly [to me anyway] an ERA just a whisker under 3.00 from May through August.)
I think I was embittered by his April, then horrified by his September. So those months burned into my memory. Thus my biased brain wouldn’t fully acknowledge his solid four months in the middle. Of course, what all of this means for Miller’s 2020 season, nobody knows. All we can say for sure is that the killer Miller of 2014-17 no longer exists.
Lots of good thoughts herein. Well done, gents.
As for how we define an “elite” ballclub, at the risk of being the lonely contrarian here, personally I’m most comfortable saying that anything at the 90th percentile or better qualifies as elite, rather than a specific threshold of wins per season. And in a 30-team competition, the 90th percentile means no more than 3 teams better than you — over a prolonged period of time, of course.
By that standard the Cardinals were elite in the 1960’s, finishing the decade with the 4th-most wins in the sport, trailing only the Orioles, Yankees, and Mays/McCovey/Marichal Giants.
Led by Whitey Herzog the Cards were elite again in the 1980’s, tying for the 4th-best record, behind the Royals, Yankees, and Tigers. (So, best in the Senior Circuit, obviously.)
In the 2000’s the Birds were 3rd in baseball, as only the Red Sox and (who else?) damn Yankees won more games. And finally, in the decade just completed the Cards finished 3rd in wins, trailing just the Yankees and Dodgers.
You may be wondering why I haven’t mentioned the number of wins the Cards averaged in any of those decades. Well, if 95 wins is the cutoff for “elite,” then the Cards haven’t had any elite decades, or even close. The 2000-2009 stretch saw the club average 91.3 wins, and that was the best Redbird decade since the unstoppable Southworth/Musial juggernauts of the 1940’s. (And by “best decade” I mean, that was the best of any ten-year stretch. Not just ten-year periods ending in a 9.)
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In short, 95 wins is a monster standard. To see how monster, I thought I’d do a bit of research on how often the Cards have had a sustained 95-win stretch. So here goes.
Longest period averaging 95+ wins since 1950? Six years with LaRussa, from 2000-2005, during which the team averaged 96 victories. Six years is fairly impressive, for sure. But the next-longest 95-win stretch during the last 70 years, for the most successful franchise in National League history, was a mere three seasons.
It happened twice, one time for the Red Schoendienst Cards (exactly 95 wins on average from 1967-69) and also the Matheny Cardinals of 2013-15, who won 96 games per year and led MLB twice in victories. (Do Matheny’s wins count, though? Because everyone knows he was incompetent, which must mean his wins were all luck and therefore he shouldn’t receive any credit.)
The best 3-year period under Hall Of Fame manager Whitey Herzog? Just 92 wins per year from 1985-87. In fact, here’s a surprising stat for the Whitey nostalgiasts out there. At 90 wins per year, the Cards averaged fewer wins during Herzog’s best 4-year stretch than the team has averaged over the past 20 seasons as a whole — the two decades being mildly lamented within this very thread. I loved Whitey and still love Whitey, as he unquestionably resuscitated the franchise. But now we have some context, to go with our sentimentality.
So I guess my short answer to your question, stl25, would be that I think the Cards can improve very slightly upon their numbers of the past 20 years, and lift that average to maybe 92 or 93 wins per year over the next decade. But the last few wins are the hardest, and I feel that 95+ is a bridge too far.
Oh, and as long as I’m playing the contrarian, one guy — even the greatest and most glamorous of superstars — is not nearly as important as a consistently strong overall development system. Just one sub-replacement level guy will negate a chunk of your superstar’s value. (And yes, I’m looking at Fowler circa 2018, and a whole junkyard of recent free agent relievers.) I really do want more stars, just like the rest of you guys, but even the best superduperstar can’t lift a team without good depth around him. Ask Mike Trout.
“So that seems like O’neill will be in LF, Fowler is sadly in RF, and Bader vs Thomas vs Edman in CF?”
Maybe I’m overthinking it, ChiTown, but I think this deal was partly to make a clearer path for someone in particular. I’d lay even money the Cards announce a Marcell Ozuna signing within 48 hours. And I’ll hate it, regardless of the dollars or duration of the contract. But it won’t be quite as painful now, since they’ll be blocking one fewer outfielder.
In a vacuum, though, this is a fine trade for both teams. Cards deal from surplus to fill a true organizational need. (And no, it has nothing to do with Liberatore’s handedness. He’s an elite pitching prospect, that’s all that ever matters.) Devil Rays improve for the now at least, and maybe the later. Much will hinge on how well Liberatore develops; he’s got talent, no doubt about it. Wonder if the young Tampa catcher involved is Edgardo Rodriguez. Looked pretty promising based on his DSL season in 2018, before a lost 2019 season.
“But, yes, when someone is caught, a common defense is that ‘everyone else is doing it, too.’ It never matters, though.”
The “everyone else is doing it” is one of the few statements that’s always a lie. But it is the World Champion Rationalization. Undefeated, never even been knocked down. It’s Marciano, Mosconi, and Bob Mathias rolled into one.
Cycling was dirty, thanks to people like Armstrong. Baseball was dirty, thanks to McGwire, Bonds, Clemens, et. al. And the Chicago cops were dirty during the days of Capone.
But not all ChiTown cops were dirty. Not all cyclists were injecting. And certainly not all baseball players chose the path of least resistance during the so-called “steroid era.”
I don’t mind beatin’ a dead horse so I’ll say it again. If Rob Manfred is at all serious about stopping electronic cheating in baseball — or at least containing it as much as is humanly possible — then lifetime banishment for the highest-up individual implicated within both the Astros and Red Sox is the sole course of action. Not just draft picks or fines or suspensions or symbolic vacated titles. Those are necessary, too, but not sufficient.
Permanent expulsion. Separate the head from the rest of the snake.
“It’s a real shame that Jim Edmonds didn’t get any support at all in his time on the ballot, although Rolen probably has a bit stronger case.”
Edmonds v. Rolen, huh? Good question, stl25.
Since the Hall Of Fame existed for many decades before WAR valuations were ever calculated, I like to primarily use the four classic Bill James HOF yardsticks to evaluate Hall candidates rather than WAR. (Yeah, I’m a heretic. Sue me.) For those not versed in said yardsticks, please check out Baseball-Reference.com.
Black Ink Test
Neither Rolen nor Edmonds score a point here, as neither ever led their league in a batting, baserunning, or (of course) pitching category.Gray Ink Test (144 points = average HOFer)
Rolen 27, Edmonds 60
Edmonds thrashes Rolen, but each of them falls far short, when it comes to ranking in league top 10’s.Hall Of Fame Monitor (100 = likely HOFer)
Rolen 99, Edmonds 88
Both have decent arguments here, Rolen a bit stronger. Neither would embarrass the Hall with their presence.Hall Of Fame Standards (50 = average HOFer)
Rolen 40, Edmonds 39
Fairly close in both cases, but certainly nothing persuasive in favor of either.So we’re left with a commonplace conundrum. If you’re a “large Hall” guy, Rolen is in, and maybe Edmonds. If “small Hall,” clearly neither makes the grade.
“It seems like we have drafted as low as any team. Does anyone know the answer to this?”
Well at the risk of stating the obvious, draft position is of course regular season record reversed. So a pretty good 20-year estimate of relative draft positions could be created by looking at each team’s regular season win total over the past two decades. Here’s the top ten.
Yankees 1,886 victories
GAP
Cardinals 1,812
Carmines 1,792
Dodgers 1,781
GAP
Braves 1,735
Athletics 1,729
Angels 1,722
GAP
Giants 1,676
Indians 1,671
GAP
Phillies 1,637I think we’re forced to conclude that the Yankees had the worst draft slots over the past 20 years. But the Cardinals could very well have had the 2nd-worst.
“How widespread is this really, on an institutional level? As they say, if you’re not cheating, you’re not trying.”
That’s what “they” say, alright. Whenever the “they” is question is a liar, thief, or cheat of some stripe.
Chris Correa was banned for life. Atlanta Braves GM John Coppollela was banned for life. So multiple precedents are already in place.
Whomever within the Astros organization (and Red Sox) was highest up in issuing the mandate for, or explicitly approving these illegal/unethical actions should be banned for life — not merely suspended.
The Astros or Red Sox cannot be permitted to become the New England Patriots of major league baseball, i.e., the team that gets a slap on the wrist and then proceeds to keep cheating over and over and over and over, winning half-fraudulent titles in the process.
The hammer needs to come down now. Swift, heavy, permanent. That’s the only sufficient curative.
“Should any credit be given for Kyle Hendrick? He was acquired in the Dempster trade with the Rangers. Obviously a shrewd acquisition, but not a home grown prospect.”
“The ranking is based on drafts. Did the Cubs draft Hendricks?”
Sorry I didn’t sufficiently clarify before, guys. The rankings I was critiquing in my earlier post — wherein the cubs were 4th and the Cardinals 7th — was an MLB Pipeline ranking of the decade’s best farm systems. The draft rankings cited previously by Brian Walton, with the Birds rated 6th, were from Baseball America. Two related but distinct rankings, from different sources, and I’m just examining the former, not the latter.
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As for Kyle Hendricks, when ranking farm systems MLB Pipeline gave credit for anyone who spent the majority of his minor league career with that franchise. Since Hendricks was still in A-ball when Chicago traded for him, the cubs do get credit for his MLB achievements. But conversely, applying the same standard they do NOT get any credit for, say, Anthony Rizzo.
Returning to the relative rankings of the Cards and cubs, we saw earlier that the Cards have generated considerably more MLB value than Chicago over the past decade, 235 WAR to 192 WAR for their Windy City rivals. But what about going forward? Which club’s farm system products look the strongest for the future?
Well, here’s all of the positive position player WAR generated in 2019 by hitters who were aged 25 and under. Cubs first.
Gleyber Torres 3.9 WAR
Eloy Jimenez 1.4
Ian Happ 1.2
Victor Caratini 0.9Not too shabby. Notice, though, the bland total for Eloy Jimenez, despite his seemingly outstanding season, with 31 homers and a .267 average for the White Sox. The trouble with the 23-year-old Jimenez is that despite his youth he’s already a lumbering liability in the outfield and on the bases. Gleyber Torres, on the other hand, looks like a big star going forward. (And Brian Cashman looks shrewd as usual, for acquiring him for three months of Aroldis Chapman.)
Anyway, that’s 7.4 WAR for the cubs. How about the young Cardinal bats in 2019?
Paul DeJong 4.1 WAR
Tommy Edman 3.8
Harry Bader 2.0
Carson Kelly 1.9So that’s 11.8 WAR for the Cards. There’s no Gleyber Torres here, but Paul DeJong has established himself as a 4-WAR borderline star, and the StL depth is quite clearly superior. But who has the better position player quartet for 2020 and beyond? For me, I’m leaning toward calling it a draw, since superstars are so rare and hard-hitting shortstop Torres is the closest thing to a likely superstar for either team. So the pitchers will have to break the tie.
————————————–This brings us to the twirlers. Here’s the complete 2019 positive WAR list of 25-and-under pitchers from the cub farm system, omitting of course the guys like Dylan Cease who generated negative WAR.
James Norwood 0.1
Yes, that is indeed THE James Norwood, late of St. Louis University, contributing the sole positive WAR value to the enemies of St. Louis. I don’t think we need a calculator to figure Norwood brings the total to 7.5 WAR for Chicago. Now the Cardinals.
Jack Flaherty 6.0
Sandy Alcantara 2.9
Zac Gallen 2.5
Dakota Hudson 2.0
Luke Weaver 1.7
Ryan Helsley 0.6
Jordan Hicks 0.6If you were wondering, that’s a cumulative 778 innings (3.22 ERA) or 768 2/3 innings more than the cub farm system generated in 2019 from its young arms. Check and mate.
Bob, I don’t share your interpretation.
Had the organization soured on Albert, they would not have fired Greer after the season and replaced him with Russ Steinhorn to run minor league hitting instruction. Steinhorn is in his 30s and has a similar philosophical outlook on hitting as Albert, I am told.At this point, there is no connection between Albert and the Astros cheating. He was not on the major league staff in 2017. However, he was among the more than 50 people interviewed, so it is still unknown if he will be punished. He told his bosses there is nothing to worry about. Yes, he could be lying. That is what due process is for. Fortunately, here in America, people are not presumed guilty (and lose their jobs and professional credibility) unless there is real evidence against them.
——————-I see what you’re saying, Brian, and I guess my earlier remarks lacked some necessary nuance. I should have said that (to me) Mo acknowledged that the transition to the Jeff Albert Way (or J.A.W.) was a failure. And furthermore that things would be done differently in 2020 than they were in 2019, when indoctrinating batters into the J.A.W. Again, paraphrasing Mo’s words they “tried to run before learning to walk.” Which I took to mean that the transition to the J.A.W. was too abrupt — but NOT that Albert’s methods in and of themselves were in any way inferior.
Jeff Albert could be the best hitting coach since sliced bread. It’s too soon to say. But it’s not at all too soon to say that the Cards as a team underachieved at the plate in 2019. (Good news is, the various forecasting systems expect numerous Redbird bouncebacks in 2020.)
Regarding the other thing, the Astro thing. I apologize for the confusion. I did not mean to imply that Jeff Albert might be crooked. I don’t think he’s crooked, and I don’t think his job is in immediate jeopardy. Not at all. What I was trying to say, though, was Jeff Albert might be the new Jeff Pentland. Remember him?
The following is excerpted from a Chicago Tribune article by Teddy Greenstein in 2001.
In his first spring training with the Cubs, in 1998, new hitting coach Jeff Pentland challenged Sosa to join baseball’s “upper echelon” of hitters.
After a season in which he batted just .251 and struck out 129 more times than he walked, Sosa was open to suggestions.
Pentland convinced him to lower his hands, to utilize his legs as a power source and, most importantly, to eliminate the “springiness” in his swing.
“Sammy always seemed like he was in a hurry to hit the ball,” Pentland says. “Everything was fast and hard and he didn’t have much finesse.
“If you watch boxers, they’re always trying to loosen their arms. Relaxation makes you quicker. Tension makes you slow.”Pentland cues up the videotape showing the 471-foot homer that Sosa cranked Saturday off future Hall of Famer Greg Maddux.
“I don’t think I’ve ever seen him swing this good,” Pentland says. “His swing is so short and his knowledge is so improved, it’s incredible. He’s getting better with age, like a fine wine. As long as he stays healthy, I don’t see him having any downside.”“Pentland’s a genius!” people exclaimed. Of course, we found out later that Jeff Pentland had little or nothing to do with Sosa’s almost magical transformation as a hitter. Like Jeff Albert, there’s no reason whatever to think Pentland was crooked. But Pentland also was not the primary cause of Sosa’s success. And similarly, it is very hard, well nigh impossible in fact, to accurately interpret the success of Astro batters over the past several seasons.
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“I don’t think it’s fair to use OPS when discussing the Cardinals offense. The Cards had a wRC+ of 95 last year, good for 7th in the NL, league average was 94.
Meanwhile, by OPS, they were 11th in the NL with .737, with league-average being .754.
They were also 4th-BEST in the NL in both 2017 and 2018 by wRC+.”Those are fair points, Pads. The Redbird home park has played at a 97 and 98 Park Factor over the past two years, so that distorts things a little. And OPS isn’t as good as wRC+, since on-base percentage is more important than slugging and raw OPS obviously does not reflect that.
I only sought to compare Cardinal hitters to themselves, relative to how they performed under the guidance of Jeff Albert, John Mabry, and Budaska/Greer. I know their wRC+ was mediocre in 2019, but I don’t have Mabry/Greer/Budda splits for wRC+ in 2018. So I just used OPS relative to league norms.
Given how much numerous Cardinal batting averages plummeted in 2019, I cannot imagine anyone would characterize the club’s season hitting line as anything other than an organizational underachievement.
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“They are banking on players rebounding from bad years. Goldschmidt, Carpenter, Fowler, DeJong, Ozuna, and Bader. That’s taking a big risk there.”
It’s a risk, Rat. No doubt. But I think it’s a good gamble, and so far the available forecasting models agree. Specifically, there are three publicly published forecasts that I know of (Steamer, Marcel, Clay Davenport), and on average they expect big bouncebacks from many Bird bats.
Again, before I list these, bear in mind that this is the average of the three available forecasts. This isn’t me. This isn’t the optimistic version. This is a trio of coolly objective systems, taken in aggregate. Nothing could be more even-handed, I don’t think. So here’s what they say.
Matt Carpenter will improve by 75 points of OPS.
Harrison Bader will increase his OPS by 61 points.
Paul Goldschmidt will be 40 points better.
Paul DeJong will see a 37-point improvement.
Yadi Molina will get a 30-point boost.Now, of course there are some less rosy forecasts too. Kolten Wong and Dexter Flower are each expected to decline by roughly 20 points, and Tommy Edman don’t even ask. Okay, an 83-point drop. But taken as a whole, and factoring in the knowledge that Edman was unlikely to get full-time at-bats anyway, this projects to a two or three game improvement in the standings.
“BA ranks the Cards as having the sixth best drafts of the last decade. (I may have already put this on another thread when it was posted on 12/31, so sorry if this is a duplication.)”
Thanks for the link, Brian. Sounds about right, a solid sixth place. And at least BA uses some sort of objective measuring tool to reach their conclusion, unlike when MLB Pipeline rated the top farm systems for the past decade — a list I know you alluded to several days back, Brian. Here’s a link to that mlb.com article: https://www.mlb.com/news/mlb-top-farm-systems-of-decade
Their ranking:
1) Atlanta
2) Houston
3) Boston
4) cubs
5) Washington
6) Arizona
7) Cardinals
8) Dodgers
9) Marlins
10) RoyalsWith Jim Callis’ name attached to it, given his awful 15-20 year track record at two websites, I assumed that the ranking would have a pro-cub or anti-Cardinal slant to it, or both. (I’ll let the reader judge that for himself or herself, once this post is over.)
Anyway, their methodology.We reviewed each player who graduated to the big leagues from 2010-19 and assigned them to the organization with which they logged the most plate appearances or innings in the Minors before losing their Rookie status. And rather than just tally Wins Above Replacement, we compensated for stars such as Ronald Acuña or Juan Soto who arrived toward the end of the 2010s by giving them credit for bright futures.
That’s an even-handed premise, as long as the teams are each measured with the same yardstick. In any case, the Cards properly get no credit for the achievements of Randal Grichuk or David Freese or Giovanny Gallegos for example, as they spent most of their minor league time in other organizations. But the Birds do get credit for instance for Adam Ottavino, who’s found greener pastures away from the Arch. The Cubs get credit for Kyle Hendricks but not Anthony Rizzo. You get the gist.
To see how well the nominal experts did with their rankings, I say we should have an objective side-by-side comparison between the two teams. Let’s see precisely how crappy and biased a job Jim Callis and Jonathan Mayo did, relative to the Cards and cubs. Or perhaps I am being unfair. Let’s crunch numbers.
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We’ll look at Baseball-Reference WAR for both teams. We’ll do this for the decade as a whole, separately tabulating totals for hitters and pitchers to clarify each organization’s respective strengths and shortcomings. (I’ll bet some of you can already see where this is headed.)
And then we’ll examine the WAR accrued just during the 2019 season by their younger pitchers & hitters, the 25-and-unders, to see which organization is likely to add the most value moving forward. Cubs get credit for 23-year-old Eloy Jimenez, the Cards for 24-year-old Jack Flaherty, and so on. (Semi-disclaimer: I may have missed a half win here or there when calculating WAR values, but I don’t think so. I’m pretty neurotic about that sort of thing.)
First, position players.
The Cardinal hitters can claim 124.2 WAR for the decade, led by Matt Carpenter with 26.7 and Kolten Wong with 15.6. Tommy Pham, Jon Jay, and Paul DeJong each exceeded 10 WAR during the decade as well.The cubs are a bit stronger in position players with 142.8 WAR from 2010-2019, topped by Kris Bryant (25.1) and D.J. LeMahieu (23.5). While the Cardinals had five position players with double-digit WAR, the cubs had six, supplementing their big two with Starlin Castro, Javy Baez, Welington Castillo, and Willson Contreras. (Why Willson wouldn’t give Welington one of his L’s, no one knows. Contraras didn’t need it, and they’re both catchers. There should be alphabetical solidarity.)
So the cubs being ranked a few slots above the Cards makes sense at this point. But unfortunately for Chicago, pitching also matters. And just like in Boston, Theo Epstein and his minions are bottom of the barrel at pitcher development. (Brief unrelated aside. According to Fangraphs, the Cubs, as an entire organization, for the whole decade 2010-2019 produced less WAR from rookie pitchers than Giovanny Gallegos produced for the Cardinals in 2019 all by himself. Stop laughing, it’s very sad.)
Pitching. The cubs had 48.9 WAR over the past decade, with 19.5 WAR from the aforementioned Kyle Hendricks. The Cards had 110.7, led by Lance Lynn with 22.2 wins above replacement. I’ll spare any cub fans the details in this matter.
That’s 234.9 WAR for St. Louis and 191.7 for Chicago. More than four wins per year on average. So there is zero room for debate, in my opinion. The cubs were not close to the Cardinals over the past decade. But what about the future?
I’ll examine that in another post much later tonight. Spoiler alert: cub fans may not want to return for that one.
Excellent points, Pads. Especially about Lohse and Peralta, both of whom had kind of slipped my mind lately. Good, relatively low-risk moves, Lohse in particular.
And if Neshek hasn’t retired, I’d like to see the Cards bring him in on an incentive-laden deal, or perhaps even as an NRI at Spring Training. I like a bullpen with a variety of pitching styles, and Neshek would of course already be familiar with the city and the organizational culture.
You’re more forgiving than I am, though, when it comes to Andrew Miller. I think Miller has also backfired pretty badly — but at least he didn’t cost a high draft pick in addition to the pile of money set on fire. Like with Holland. Bleccch.
The B-Ref and Fangraphs sites each have Miller sub-replacement level for last year, and his Win Probability Added was also quite poor, signifying that he was at his worst at pretty much the worst possible times. (Actually, now that I look it up, he permitted just a .637 OPS in “low leverage” situations, and a .786 in “high leverage.”)
Who should the Cards go after in free agency, even on the cheaper deals? You’re right, Pads, that’s the key. And the scout or scouts who recommended Cecil, Gregerson, Holland, and Miller should be sacked. Or reassigned anyway. Because that quartet has an $80,000,000 price tag and has (per B-Ref values) cost the team three full games in the standings. Yes, they’ve been collectively worth negative three WAR so far.
Anyway, like cranny and card25, I am very optimistic about KK Kim. And I wish that casual fans didn’t judge him by the modest contract. He’s a real talent, even if he’ll make a fraction of fellow lefties Keuchel, Bumgarner, and Ryu. People praise the short-term deal for Kim. But at a mere $4-5M per year, I’d rather have him for a decade than just two years. I’ve got a good feeling about the guy.
Thanks very much for the Mo interview link, Brian! I had no idea there was a regular radio gig at 11:30 Sunday mornings. I’ll have to start tuning in.
Two strongly positive things struck me.
1) Zero mention of Marcell Ozuna at all, from either Ackerman or Mo, when discussing the outfield picture moving forward. Maybe I missed something that was edited out, but to my overjoyed ears it sure sounded like Mo was ready to give the young guns the chance to prove themselves.
2) Mo tacitly accepted that the Jeff Albert Way was a flop. Which of course it was, and a dismal one. I’ll elaborate on that in a minute.
But first, speaking of hitting coaches, let’s recap the past two seasons:
In 2018 with John Mabry as hitting coach, the team posted an OPS 8 points below the N.L. average. Then, after Mabry was replaced midseason by a pair of highly respected, albeit old school back-to-basics organization men in Mark Budaska and George Greer — and despite two fine hitters (Pham, Voit) being traded away around the same time — the Cards skyrocketed to an OPS 31 points above the N.L. average.Then in 2019, with Astros boy genius Jeff Albert brought in as hitting coach, and with the tremendous (and tremendously consistent) bat of Paul Goldschmidt added to the everyday lineup, and with Tommy Edman providing a lightning bolt out of the blue, the Cardinals staggered to an OPS 16 points below the National League average. (Budaska and Greer, oldsters both, were of course fired.)
Summary:
In 2018, with Mabry and a full roster, a bit below average team hitting.
In 2018, with Greer & Budaska, but no Pham or Voit, elite team hitting.
In 2019, with Jeff Albert, plus Goldy & Edman, quite poor team hitting.So, the Jeff Albert Way was a flop. But Mo acknowledged it! He specifically said that the team “tried to run before walking,” and that this year the ongoing transition to Jeff Albert’s methods would be handled differently. (Now, if it were up to me, I’d have probably just gotten rid of the guy. Especially since we now know that at least some of the Astro hitters of at least the past three seasons are frauds to an unknown extent, much like the New England Patriots of the Belicheat years.)
But for some crazy reason the Cardinal brass did not seek my advice, so Jeff Albert endures. At any rate, as frustrating as 2019 was, it is nevertheless quite encouraging to hear Mo admit the gaffe publicly. That’s truly admirable, in its way. (From the outside looking in, though, and with the admittedly incomplete information that implies, it still feels like the discarding of the two wise and wizened hitting coaches was rather shameful. Maybe the Coen Brothers should write an adaptation: No Cardinals For Old Men.)
“…I still would prefer waiting until the end of the year and give Yadi a lesser contract like they did with Waino. I understand wanting to respect a legend but didn’t his current $60M contract show enough respect?”
“I am not into the lifetime achievement awards. That is why we currently have no payroll flexibility.”
I am with you 100%, gscott, regarding Yadi. He’s only been a real asset with the bat once or twice in the past half dozen years, and moreover the framing/blocking/throwing have declined to the point where the team ERA has been lower over the past two years with the backups behind the dish than with Yadi — a truly HUGE reversal of his previous career-long trend.
Lots of blame to go around, though, when it comes to the payroll squeeze. And this would be good timing for payroll flexibility, right? I mean, wouldn’t it be nice to have, say, Mookie Betts plus some dough left over, instead of Fowler, Cecil, and Miller? That trying trio will make about $35,000,000 in 2020. (They’ve combined to give the club just under one WAR, for just over 80 million bucks.)
Mo and Girsch were bailed out by the draft & development people in 2019, thanks to tremendous contributions from Flaherty, Hudson, Edman, Wong, and DeJong. The raft of bad contracts was gonna get the front office gutted in my opinion, if the club missed the playoffs for a fourth straight season. But perhaps that’s just wishful thinking. (Relatedly, the ubiquitous StL/Ozuna talk is really starting to give me a belly ache, a baseball ulcer, just like the Hosmer and Fowler speculation did — and somehow one of those horror stories came true, unfortunately. If they bring Ozuna back, throwing away the draft pick and blocking those talented young outfielders*, then they have learned exactly nothing from the Dexter debacle.)
But I digress. This a Yadi thread, and as others have said, the thing that’s best for the team in my eyes is to wait. Wait, like they should’ve waited on the Carpenter extension. Wait, like they should’ve waited on the Goldschmidt extension. Wait, like they probably should’ve waited on the Mikolas extension. Wait to see how much more Yadi has aged, wait until you don’t have to by rule give him an overpay. Wait until November when you can give him a contract that aligns with the 38-year-old player he’ll be then — not the star he was three or four seasons ago.
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*Don’t anyone say “There’s no such thing as too much talent on a roster.” Tell that to Tommy Pham, who made the mistake of competing for playing time with Delicate Dexter Fowler, the 82 million dollar man. If the Cards retain Ozuna, it will not only unnecessarily cost them money and a high draft pick, but I’d bet a month’s rent it will sooner or later mean trading away some outfielder (or two or three) for much less than full value. Just like with Pham.
The following is not intended as a rebuttal of anyone in particular. (All WAR values come from Baseball-Reference.com.)
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I understand that some Redbird fans, and some sportswriters, are most comfortable by far with what might be called “veteran certainty,” and thus advocate that the Cards retain Marcell Ozuna for left field. (Among local scribes, Derrick Goold in particular likes to talk a lot about Marcell Ozuna’s “certainty” and how valuable that is.) So let’s look at what veteran certainty has gotten the club over the past few years.
The past three offseasons have seen trades for power-hitting MLB veterans Marcell Ozuna and Paul Goldschmidt, as well as the free agent signings of veteran outfielder Dexter Fowler and a quartet of well-established thirtysomething MLB relievers.
Those seven MLB veterans have so far combined for 13 seasons wearing the Birds on the Bat, and cost the Cardinals $143,000,000 — plus three high draft picks, plus four years of Luke Weaver (1.7 WAR in 2019), five years of Carson Kelly (1.9 WAR), six years of Zac Gallen (2.5 WAR), and six of Sandy Alcantara (2.9 WAR).
For that $143,000,000, plus the three high draft picks, and the 21 years of what looks to be highly productive player control, the Cards have so far gotten 6.8 WAR worth of “veteran certainty.” As you no doubt noted, the four UN-certain NON-veterans produced 9 WAR in 2019 alone. And there’s 17 more seasons to go.
Ahh, but that’s not all. How about the “low-hanging” acquisitions of the past few years, the guys without MLB “veteran certainty” to their names? How have those turned out?
Low-hanging foreign imports Miles Mikolas and Seunghwan Oh have combined to cost the Cards just under $21M for four years of production. Just under $21M, and no draft picks, and no young talent. And in return the Birds got 5.9 WAR from the Lizard King and 2.6 more from the Final Boss. So, recapping. Low hangers, 8.5 WAR for under $21M. Veteran certainty, I can’t bear to type it again.
The Cards should get back to what they do right. Get back to the First Principles that have led them to so much success during the DeWitt years.
1) Develop from within, both bats & arms.
2) Make small shrewd free agent signings, and trades when needed.
3) Retain your stars and superstars when possible.What is not and should never be on that list, is blocking very good internal options with merely above average hitters and pitchers. They let Kyle Lohse go via free agency, even though he was coming off a real fine season, because they had pitchers in the pipeline. They let Lance Lynn* go, even though he was still good, and well-liked, because they had pitchers in the pipeline.
And now they should let Marcell Ozuna go. Because there isn’t a team in the majors with as much young outfield talent as the Cardinals. The organizational depth chart is literally littered with guys who’ve (in various sample sizes) dominated Triple-A or the majors already. Are they all future stars? Nope, not at all. And neither is Marcell Ozuna. Some baby birds of course are more prepared than others for a fulltime MLB role — but in my unhumble opinion there is nearly zero chance that Ozuna is significantly better at the plate than all of them right now. And Ozuna needs to be significantly better than all of them with the bat, because they’re pretty much all faster afield with stronger throwing arms than Harvey Wallclimber.
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*(Lance Lynn is obviously a special case, as I think the Cards would’ve happily kept him if he’d have signed for $12M for one season, or $10M a year for three years. But when he turned free agent, of course nobody thought he’d be available at those prices, or even close. Good heavens, Zach Wheeler just got $120M with much the lesser resume than Lance had.)
I would just more or less echo all of Brian’s thoughts on this matter — but with one addition.
I think I’ve been too skeptical about a certain Cardinal arm over the past few years, owing mainly to his rather advanced age for each of his minor league stops. So, in support of this pitcher I want to do a copy & paste from a recent Derrick Goold chat.
Fun stat coming. The following ten great pitchers have allowed a collective career OPS of .639 when used as a starting pitcher: Scherzer, Kershaw, Strasburg, Cole, Verlander, Greinke, DeGrom, Bumgarner, Kluber, and Sale. Again, that’s a .639 OPS allowed as a starter.
There’s a current Redbird twirler with just a couple years experience who has allowed a mere .632 OPS as a starter. Think about that, huh? By one meaningful measure, slightly better so far than the career average of a bunch of superstars. And that Cardinal pitcher’s name is not Jack Flaherty or Dakota Hudson. It’s Daniel Ponce de Leon. As Casey said, you can look it up.
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And I would add that Ponce hasn’t allowed a stolen base in 72 opportunities. (That is, conventional opportunities, man on first base with second base unoccupied.) So, with a great OPS against, and the utter negation of a running game, why isn’t his major league ERA much more dazzling? He’s permitted an .839 OPS with RISP — and a nightmarish .976 with two outs and RISP.
Maybe he overthrows under pressure, maybe he tightens up just a little, or tips his pitches periodically. I don’t know what it is, assuming of course that it’s anything other than random. But it’s certainly something for Maddux, Shildt, and Ponce to look into.
“Well, Jeter is not going to get 100 percent. This is a most curious ballot, for nine, not 10 candidates.”
So, was that cited ballot just a meager practical joke by Mr. DeJesus, Brian? Because I still see Derek Jeter with 100% at Ryan Thibodeaux’s website.
And speaking of Marlins CEO Jeter, I don’t think he’s received enough attention for the attendance boost in Miami from 2018 to 2019. Specifically, the fish improved the head count from 811,104 all the way to 811,302. At that rate of growth they’ll top three million fans in just 11,055 more years.
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