[Bob Reed]

How do you mean, Rat? Who else, in what way?

[Bob Reed]

History Lesson. Some years ago another switch-hitting Redbird rookie in his age 23/24 season advanced to the majors and out-performed his minor league track record by a substantial margin. This rookie posted a 118 wRC+ and a higher OPS in the majors than he had in AAA the same season. It smelled like a fluke, and it was.

Over the next 8 seasons he had a mere 95 wRC+, a far cry from 118 and a big disappointment for those expecting a quality MLB batter. BUT here’s the thing. His defense/baserunning were so good, that he still accumulated 24 WAR during those 8 “disappointing” years.

If you haven’t guessed, that player was Terry Pendleton.

————————————–

I like Tommy Edman a lot, and have ever since I saw him in Peoria a few years back. He was on third base, and took an aggressive leadoff. The next pitch bounced in, and squirted no more than 15 feet away from the catcher — but Edman got such a good lead and such a great jump toward home plate, that he scored standing up. Fast, alert, aggressive. Who wouldn’t like that?

But much like Pendleton 35 years earlier, Tommy is not a hitter like he showed under the Arch last year.

Here are his wRC+ numbers at each minor league stop where he was age-appropriate (100 being league average of course).

2017 in High-A 106
2018 in Double-A 108
2019 in Triple-A 108

With okay play discipline at each stop, but nothing special. And then he had a 123 for the Cardinals. He’s not going to do that again, and probably not coming close. BUT he should be a roughly league average hitter for the foreseeable future, and thanks to his defense & baserunning & versatility, that makes him a big part of the Cardinals’ future. Maybe as a utilityman forever, or maybe as Kolten Wong’s successor in two years, we’ll see.

Now, let it be said that Pendleton did have a pair of monster seasons for the Braves, many years after that surprising rookie campaign. And I wouldn’t rule out Tommy morphing into a .280, 20 HR guy eventually. Say in his late 20’s. But we shouldn’t hold out hope for that, or expect anything like 2019 again any time soon. It’s not impossible, but it’s highly unlikely.

[Bob Reed]

I’d like to put Harry Bader’s sub-mediocre hitting into a context, alongside some other well-known centerfield flycatchers.

Entering his age 25 season, Harrison Bader has a career wRC+ of 92, in 925 plate appearances.

Entering his age 25 season, Curt Flood had a career wRC+ of 91 across 2,215 plate appearances.

Entering his age 25 season, Terry Moore had a career wRC+ of just 81, in 1,607 PA’s.

And lastly, late bloomer Lorenzo Cain, entering his age 28 season, had a career wRC+ of 90.

—————————————–

Yeah, it’s frustrating to watch a guy fail at the plate. But in general the smart managers stick with the great defenders, and hope the hitting comes around.

Or think of it this way. (Digression Alert!) As everyone here knows, the highly successful 1980’s Cardinals are being celebrated with a documentary on the MLB Network right now. Let’s take a quick look at exactly how successful they were, and maybe more importantly how their success was achieved.

From 1982-1987, the Cards led the N.L. in regular season victories (4th overall in MLB), and of course captured a trio of pennants. Pretty dominant, right? But they averaged a surprisingly modest 88 wins over those exciting six seasons. On the other hand they’ve averaged 89 wins in the 24 years of DeWitt ownership, which is 2nd in the N.L. to the Braves, and also 4th in all of MLB. So in terms of regular season success, the entire 24 years of DeWitt ownership matches almost precisely the best 6-year stretch of Whiteyball. Yeah, it surprised me too.

Let’s dig into the details. Last year the mucho-maligned Cardinal batters had a cumulative 95 wRC+, which was ranked 15th in the majors. Well, from 1982-1987 they posted a 92 wRC+. Only four MLB teams were worse.

But of course, what made the ’82-’87 team so successful was they had the best defense and best baserunning in the sport. And whaddayaknow, the current iteration excels in both also, albeit not quite to the same degree. (In 2019, per Fangraphs the Birds had the 4th-best defense and 2nd-best baserunning in all of baseball.)

So the Cards right now are winning now in much the same way that they did in the Whiteyball Era! The problem with the current Cards, is the same as the problem for pretty much all teams. Which is that batting averages are so low now, and doubles & triples so minimized, that the game is — to many fans, sometimes even those of winning teams — less aesthetically pleasing than in some seasons past. Like the Birds in the 1980’s.

Anyway, anyone who waxes rhapsodic about the 1980’s Redbirds, or fondly recalls Curt Flood or Terry Moore, should be embracing Harry Bader. Because he’s exactly that kind of player.

[Bob Reed]

“The funny thing is that the effect that mudville describes sounds a lot more like the effect that greenies gave to players for decades. But we will never criticize those guys, because ‘amphetamines aren’t nearly as helpful as steroids.'”

————————–

We’ve been over this ground, tripleshy. Two months ago on this very thread.

Greenies were banned in April of 1971, just like anabolic steroids without a proper prescription. Anyone taking greenies before that (Mickey Mantle, et. al.) was NOT violating MLB’s Drug Policy. Anyone who used greenies after April 1971 would have been in violation of MLB’s formal drug policy.

And I have no doubt that some ballplayers still chose to violate that policy — because of human nature being a flawed thing. There are liars and cheats and thieves in every single occupation, every social strata. But two months ago, your claim was that numerous players were taking greenies AFTER the ban of 1971. Specifically, you offered this:

“Bob, they (amphetamines) were commonplace in baseball throughout the 90’s, and the nineties use was less than the 80’s. And the 80’s less than the 70’s. And if my elders are to be believed, the 70’s were their peak (into the early 80’s).”

I don’t know who you referenced by citing your “elders,” but I invited you then, and invite you now, to provide one article, one link to any scrap of concrete evidence, or even anecdotal ex-player confessorial evidence, of the “commonplace” use of greenies at any point AFTER the ban by Bowie Kuhn in 1971. You provided no evidence then, and now two more months have passed.

If I’m ignorant or naïve, then please enlighten me. Enlighten all of us.

[Bob Reed]

The splits I got for Austin Dean differed a bit from Pads’, with Dean batting a tremendous .377 and slugging .682 against minor league southpaws over the past two years (57-151 with 103 total bases).

Also, one other thing. His New Orleans home park didn’t do him any favors in 2019, as his road batting average was a gaudy .361 with a .677 slugging percentage. Now, we should bear in mind of course that he was old for his leagues, and furthermore the juiced ball was introduced to AAA in 2019.

But still, you can see how the Cards would want him competing with Ravelo and others for that 26th man slot. (My concern on the other hand is that for a year and a half we’ve watched the current manager give excessive playing time to bad-fielding flycatchers, and overuse at least one guy who really should have been a straight platoon player. Austin Dean may bring out the worst impulses of the manager — starting the better hitter while benching the better overall ballplayer.)

[Bob Reed]

Longenhagen publicly admitted a couple of years ago that he had fewer contacts within the St. Louis organization than any other team in the majors. And it shows.

There is so much awfulness of logic and outright misinformation within their Redbird rankings as to render them more or less useless. (The Diowill Burgos at #11 has to be a gag, though. Something to try and get under the skin of Cardinal fans — for whom Longenhagen has expressed his contempt in the past.)

McDaniel and Longenhagen are terrible. But hey, don’t take my word. Just go back and check their lists from the past couple of years and the weak inaccurate grades they gave DeJong & Bader & Flaherty & Hudson & Hicks & Edman & Carson Kelly & Zac Gallen & Sandy Alcantara & Luke Weaver & on and on. They’ve broken new ground with Angel Rondon, though. It’s as if they literally do not know who he is, his age, or where and how well he’s pitched over his career.

[Bob Reed]

I had Burgos in the 45-55 range among Redbird farmhands. He killed the DSL at age 18, which due to his age may or may not be meaningful. The club knew that it may or may not be meaningful, so they promoted him to a tougher and somewhat more age-appropriate level of competition, the Gulf Coast League.

In the Gulf Coast League Burgos struck out 30% of the time and batted .205. Not only is that a poor performance, but a very high strikeout rate for a rookieball batter who is NOT young for his league, is generally a terrible sign going forward. (I cannot explain the Fangraphs ranking. McDaniel and Longenhagen must have been dropped on their heads as infants. Repeatedly.)

Almost any young guy can theoretically turn out to be a major leaguer. But I wouldn’t do any hand-wringing over the loss of Diowill. And I think most people at this board know by now that I tend toward optimism when it comes to Cardinal farmhands. I’m assuming Austin Dean is basically Triple-A backfill, for Rangel Ravelo when Ravelo makes the 26-man roster on Opening Day.

[Bob Reed]

“Bob, I think you are close but it will take a little more than that.
I would say Carp+$8M/yr, O’Neill, Knizner, Oviedo and Cabrera.”

I’d do that one, gscott. Provided Arenado is waiving the opt-out. I don’t like a 7-year commitment, but I strongly prefer it to just 2 years. Then pray he’ll age like Brooks Robinson or Adrian Beltre, not David Wright or Eric Chavez.

What I would not do, is include Dakota Hudson under any circumstances. Not if Colorado took Matt Carpenter and Dexter Fowler’s full contracts in the deal and shipped half the Rocky Mountains to St. Louis. Nada, no way. Hudson has had four straight years of elite pitching performance and laudable health. Jack & Dak should be a 1-2 rotation punch for the next half decade.

————————————-

As for the comparisons to the Stanton trade, well I don’t see the situations as equivalent. Similar, of course. But different, too. The Marlins were clearly desperate to separate themselves from that massive Stanton contract. The situation was a public organizational embarrassment, as the fish sought to gut their talent base — and of course Ozuna and Yelich were soon to follow. And Miami had very limited trade latitude, with Stanton dictating his destination of course.

This does not have quite the same vibe. Arenado does not have to be moved, and it does not have to be one of 3 or 4 teams. But maybe most importantly, Miami was in my opinion an even more directionless organization than Colorado. (Or plain dumber if you prefer. Look what little they got for Yelich. Ugh.)

The Stanton/Arenado cases are similar only in the most general way. The particulars feel substantially different to me. And again, we cannot expect to fleece the Rockies like the Yanks did the Marlins — assuming obviously that Stanton returns to being a star.

[Bob Reed]

“So Bob, let me get this straight:
You think the Cardinals would trade for Arenado who makes $35M/Year and would also part of Marp’s contract if he waves his NTC?”

Honestly, I don’t know, BHC. Some teams are more obstinate than others when it comes to “eating” player salary. I only know that I would be willing to give my stamp of approval to my above-suggest swap: Arenado for Carp, Knizner, O’Neill and a non-elite non-MLB pitcher. And yes, $4-6M paydown on Carpenter’s contract. At least for the 2020 season.

So, Colorado saves a couple hundred million overall, and roughly $20M for 2020, and the gap between Arenado & Carpenter is at least potentially counterbalanced by the dual upgrades at catcher and corner outfield. (Rockies are currently an astonishing half a win below replacement level in left field, per Fangraphs depth charts.)

But let’s hash this out in some detail. Let’s try and think like Mozeliak. How about this. The Cards are going to have to give Arenado something in dollars and cents to get him to drop the opt-out. (That’s by rule. Part of the CBA.) So let’s say that they add on a year to the end of his deal, at $30M. That’s a pretty nice sweetener, I would think.

But in so doing, the Cardinals also request that Arenado re-structure the first couple of years (2020 & 2021) reducing his salary by $6M per year, and then redistributing that $12M evenly over the final six years of his contract. The Birds have a LOT of player payroll coming off the books after 2021, so this feels like a fiscal fit to me.

I don’t know how much Arenado would like to join his good friend Goldschmidt on an annually competitive team. Maybe he’s getting pretty excited about the prospect. Or maybe instead he adores Denver and hates humidity, I dunno. But I think this might be a time to get creative.

[Bob Reed]

“Bader is a bust like most prospects. Only a handful make it big (Pujols, Molina, Flaherty and a very few others). He’s just another flop.”

Excerpted from the top of the thread:

Paul DeJong 4.0 WAR per 600 plate appearances for his career so far.
Yadi Molina 3.7 WAR
Harrison Bader 3.7 WAR
Matt Carpenter 3.5 WAR
Derek Jeter 3.4 WAR

I have neither the energy nor inclination to try and distinguish which people on the internet are sincere in their statements and which ones are not. So this post exists mostly to reiterate blandly & succinctly the initial point, i.e., that Bader so far for his MLB career as a whole has been much nearer a borderline star than a bust.

—————————

“…who is to say that one of the other candidates cannot deliver as much or more WAR while being a better balanced player?”

That’s a good question, Brain, and raises another one. Is a “balanced” 3-WAR player more valuable than an imbalanced one? I think the answer is: only under very specific circumstances. Like, say the Cardinals had a pair of corner outfielders with really excellent range. Then Bader’s defensive value in center might be slightly diminished.

Similarly, if the Birds had a seriously groundball-centric rotation, then infield defense becomes more important than outfield range, and thus Bader is less valuable. Makes perfect sense, right?
But here’s the thing. Bader’s defensive numbers have been fantastic so far for his career despite the Cards having the most groundball-heavy rotation in the majors over the past two years. Link: https://www.fangraphs.com/leaders.aspx?pos=all&stats=sta&lg=all&qual=0&type=8&season=2019&month=0&season1=2018&ind=0&team=0,ts&rost=0&age=0&filter=&players=0&startdate=2018-01-01&enddate=2019-12-31&sort=13,d

Given my druthers, I want the best up-the-middle defenders I can get — as long as the player’s overall value doesn’t dip below 2.5 – 3 WAR per full season. I can’t help feeling that it’s better for the pitching staff, both effectiveness and morale. So get the bigger boppers for the corners, hopefully without sacrificing too much glovework either. (By the way, “Brain” was an intentional typo. In honor of the late Harry Dean Stanton.)

[Bob Reed]

“I will repeat what I have asked before. Why do we think the Rockies would want Carpenter (or Fowler, if you please)? (I get why it is good for the Cardinals, so no need to explain that.) In the vernacular of this discussion, the Rockies have all the leverage.”

Just spitballing here. If the Rockies believe Carpenter will bounce back to a roughly 3 WAR player in 2020 and 2-2.5 WAR in 2021, and the Cards are willing to eat some of his contract, then there would be some appeal there. Trading Arenado straight up for prospects means the Rockies have an immediate dropoff of 5-6 wins from the hot corner. With Carpenter in the deal the dropoff might be far less precipitous.

As for leverage, I can’t speak to how motivated the Rockies are. But if Colorado wants very much to divorce itself from a nearly quarter billion dollar commitment, while making their team stronger beginning in 2021 or 2022 than they would be by simply hanging on to Arenado and doing nothing, then Arenado for Carp + Knizner + O’Neill + a pitching prospect might very well get the job done. And it works for the Cards, as they continue to trade from depth — in this case both outfield and catcher.

[Bob Reed]

Short answer, Chitown, not enough evidence of sustainable health/durability. Ryan looked promising after tossing 132 innings in 2017. But then he threw fewer than 75 frames in both 2018 and 2019.

And he looked very solid pitching out of the MLB bullpen. For me, that’s his fit going forward. Could be a real high-leverage asset in relief.

[Bob Reed]

I suspect that the answer, ChiTown, is that if the Cards went after a free agent, even if they got him, then they’d be over a barrel with a serious surplus of extremely expensive corner infielders. No leverage whatsoever, while trying to trade away Carpenter (or Goldy, theoretically).

What did you think of my trade idea?

Knizner plus an outfielder not named Bader, plus Matt Carpenter with a little salary relief included (say $3-5M per year), plus a modest but not inconsequential sweetener from the minor league pitching ranks like Kodi Whitley or Genesis Cabrera or Johan Oviedo.

[Bob Reed]

I hadn’t given this much thought before, but the Cards could be a natural fit with the Rockies, because Colorado’s starting catcher Tony Wolters (a 27-year-old with 2.3 career WAR) slugged .329 in 2019, his backup was 36 years old, and their farm system is utterly backstop-bereft.

So Knizner to Colorado makes perfect sense as part of a swap. Yadi signs his one or two-year extension and Ivan Herrera becomes the next “catcher of the future.” Knizner plus an outfielder not named Bader, plus Matt Carpenter with a little salary relief included (say $3-5M per year), plus a modest but not inconsequential sweetener from the minor league pitching ranks like Kodi Whitley or Genesis Cabrera or Johan Oviedo, et Voila!

[Bob Reed]

Since Dakota Hudson has become the de facto topic at this thread, this seems like a good place to rant.

Hudson was in my opinion one of the 25 or 30 best starting pitchers in the sport in 2019. Only 14 twirlers in all the major leagues threw as many innings with a lower ERA than Hudson. FIP can be a fascinating data point, but ERA describes reality and FIP is theory.

Dakota Hudson versus FIP, covering all of his professional performances exceeding 25 innings. (And using Clay Davenport’s version of FIP.)

2017 in AA, 2.53 ERA and 4.14 FIP
2017 in AAA, 4.42 ERA and 4.78 FIP
2018 in AAA, 2.50 ERA and 4.05 FIP
2018 in MLB, 2.63 ERA and 5.07 FIP
2019 in MLB, 3.35 ERA and 4.58 FIP

On average Hudson beat his FIP by 1.44 runs.

—————————-

But small samples can mislead. Let’s just look at the samples of more than 110 innings.

2017 in Double-A, ERA 1.61 lower than FIP
2018 in Triple-A, ERA 1.55 lower than FIP
2019 in the N.L., ERA 1.23 lower than FIP

So, using only the largest sample sizes, he beats his FIP by an average of 1.46 runs. Now, is that the professional profile of someone with a specific repeatable set of skills? Or someone who gets incredibly lucky over and over and over? The former feels more likely than the latter to me.

Stealing from a different thread:
In 2014 and 2015 college pitcher Dakota Hudson threw just 17 innings each year. Then in 2016, with that paucity of major college pitching experience, he nevertheless dominated college baseball as a starting pitcher in the toughest conference, which resulted in his being drafted in the first round.

Then in 2017 he dominated Double-A. Won the ERA crown and was Pitcher of the Year in his league. In 2018 he dominated Triple-A. Lowest ERA for anyone with 100+ innings, and again Pitcher of the Year. And then in 2019 he enjoyed conspicuous success as a starting pitcher in the major leagues. Why is a pitcher with this resume still dismissed by a great many people as some sort of fluke?

Lastly, I believe Hudson was (understandably) overshadowed by Jack Flaherty’s historic second half of the season in 2019. Dak wasn’t Jack, but he was much tougher over the second half than the first — and especially during the final couple of months. In August Hudson allowed a .193 batting average and a .600 OPS. In September he permitted just a .163 average, and a .602 OPS.

That career arc taken as a whole, and that finish, that final couple of months, both suggest to me a terrific pitcher just scratching the surface of his talent.

[Bob Reed]

“But then there are Marco Gonzales, Weaver, Alcantara, Hudson and Flaherty to potentially help balance it out. The organization has had a lot of top 100 pitching talent in the last decade…”

Well said, Brian. And Lance Lynn and Zac Gallen and Jordan Hicks as well. Although of course none of them ever even made the back end of anyone’s top 100 list. And by the by, Dakota Hudson never made the top 100 at MLB Pipeline or Baseball Prospectus. Or Keith Law or Fangraphs, I’m sure, since they both pegged him as a reliever.

As Brian implied, during the Mozeliak decade-plus, the Redbird pitching prospect outcomes overall have probably matched if not exceeded the industry-wide expectations. Here’s a dirty little secret about prospect lists: if all prospects were evaluated exactly right, there’d be guys ranked in the top 100 who only wind up with a handful of career WAR. Like 5 or 6 WAR for their entire careers.

Here’s a rough guideline for how their careers would actually shake out, if all minor leaguers were placed on a top 100 list with flawless foresight.

Top 8-10 prospects, 60+ WAR and the Hall Of Fame.

Next 10-12 prospects, 30+ WAR, Hall Of Very Good.

Next 12-15 prospects, 20-30 WAR. Cool rule of thumb is the “20/30 Law.” A prospect ranked 20th should accrue ~30 career WAR, and one ranked 30th should accumulate 20 career WAR, give or take.

Next 15-20 prospects, 12-18 WAR.
Next 20-30 prospects, 8-12 WAR.
Rest of the top 100, about 4-6 WAR.

———————————–

We hear “top 100 prospect!” and we think a guy will be at least an above average regular, or mid-rotation starter, or longtime closer. But that’s more like top 50 and up. If not top 40.

[Bob Reed]

“No one knows if he can correct his problems until he plays.”

Exactly, GC. The best managers know they have to play the great fielders even when they’re slumping at the plate, so the bat can develop. And even in the seasons when those bats are wet noodles — which naturally leads to a LOT of frustration from fans — the players still nevertheless contribute at an average-or-better overall rate, thanks to tremendous glovework.

In 2019 Shildt to his credit stuck with Wong when he had a dreadful sub-600 OPS for a two-month stretch. LaRussa stuck by Yadi when he didn’t hit as a young player, and Herzog did the same with Ozzie, not unlike Earl Weaver with Mark Belanger. There were no precisely calibrated “advanced metrics” needed to tell those latter managers how valuable their glovemen were. They just knew it.

—————————-

“Once his bat cooled as the league figured him out, the 2019 version just might be the guy he is going forward. Unfortunately, it’s a story we’ve seen before from Grichuk, Piscotty, etc.
Can you talk me off this ledge, Bob? What makes Harrison different?”

Since you specifically referenced Grichuk & Piscotty, stl25, let’s look at them, and see what we see. As I’m sure everyone here recalls, they were both terrific hitters as rookies in 2015, then drastically declined afterwards. So we don’t want Bader to be like them. Right?

Well, maybe not right. Because Grichuk and Piscotty, taking only their seasons after 2015, have actually come pretty darn close in MLB to their upper minors hitting performances.

Grichuk in AA and AAA combined to post an average wRC+ of 109. From 2016-2019 in over 2,000 plate appearances he has an even 100 wRC+. Not a huge dropoff, from 109 to 100.

Piscotty in AA and AAA combined to post an average wRC+ of 115. From 2016-2019, also in just over 2,000 trips to the plate, Piscotty has a 110 wRC+. So the performance has been fine, really. Our expectations were skewed by the crazy 2015 seasons — just like Tommy Edman’s fluky 2019 at the major league level, after a mere 108 wRC+ in both AAA in 2019 and AA in 2018.

So again, Grichuk & Piscotty, not including their fluke 2015 debuts, have performed just a little worse at the plate than they did across Double-A and Triple-A. You know what Harry Bader did in AA/AAA? A combined wRC+ of 127. If he comes within 25 points of that he’s Lorenzo Cain, i.e., a star.

—————————-

If Bader does become an annual 80 wRC+ guy I would be shocked and very disappointed. But the thing is, and this is the hard part to accept as a fan, right now his defense and baserunning are of such surpassing quality that even at that dismal level of batting he’d still be a 2.5 to 3 WAR player if given 140-145 starts.

[Bob Reed]

“Just look at what the team could look like heading into 2022:
C – Knizner, Molina
1B – Goldschmidt
2B – Edman, Sosa, Wong (FA after 2021)
SS – DeJong
3B – Montero, Mendoza
OF – Carlson, Thomas, Bader, Williams, O’Neill
SP – Mikolas, CMart, Flaherty, Hudson, Reyes, Gomber, Helsley, Cabrera, Woodford
RP – Gant, Brebbia, Hicks, Gallegos, Ponce de Leon, Fernandez”

“Bottom line for me is that is not an elite roster. It could be a good roster capable of 90 wins but we will need help from the outside to get back to 95-100 wins.”

—————————-

First, thanks for taking the trouble to put that lineup/roster together, Forschy. I do lean toward gscott’s view though that it’s a very good (but not great) assemblage.

Looking at ways for the 2022 team to be an improvement on the 2019 squad, I think it has to come from the position player side. The 2019 pitching staff posted a cumulative 112 ERA+, and it’s a lot to ask for them to improve meaningfully upon that.

How do teams break through to greatness — and stay there for more than a year or two? I believe it’s pretty much one thing, and we all know what that is. Stars.

The deceptively straightforward pathway to an elite 2022 (and beyond) team is for one of Dylan Carlson, Nolan Gorman, or Ivan Herrera to emerge as a 6-WAR superstar — the 15-1 longshot option — or two of them to be 4-WAR stars. The likeliest thing in my opinion is that one of them becomes a borderline star, one a solid regular, and one a bench guy. But even that could be enough for a true talent 95-win team, provided Dakota Hudson* keeps improving, and one from among Angel Rondon, Matthew Liberatore, and Zack Thompson becomes a mid-rotation stalwart. But look at me, I’m already dreaming unfairly about better pitching!

—————————

*Quick recap. In 2014 and 2015 college pitcher Dakota Hudson threw just 17 innings each year. Then in 2016 he dominated college baseball, as a starting pitcher in the toughest conference, which resulted in his being drafted in the first round. Then in 2017 he dominated Double-A. In 2018 he dominated Triple-A. And then in 2019 he enjoyed conspicuous success as a starting pitcher in the major leagues. Why is a pitcher with this resume still dismissed by a great many people as some sort of fluke? I’ll tell you why. In poker it’s called: think long, think wrong.

[Bob Reed]

The problem with ANY offer for Arenado, is the length(s) of his contract.

Two years isn’t enough. (The opt-out possibility.)
Seven years is too much. (Profound decline is a real threat.)

The sweet spot for a guy Arenado’s age would be 4 or 5 years for a long term contract. And no matter what, the Cards would be getting a contract multiple years different from that. On top of which, Busch III has been rough on righty power hitters. That doesn’t help.

———————————

This should be in a different thread, but how about:
Liberatore and Fowler for Mookie Betts. Cards eat all but $7M of this year’s Fowler salary, and Sawx pay all of next year.

Boston shaves $20M off their 2020 player payroll, which apparently is a big deal for them. And they get an excellent young prospect quite familiar to the new baseball chief, Chaim Bloom.

Cards add $20M to this year’s payroll, which apparently is a big deal for them. But StL ownership is okay with that, since they also instantly add five freaking wins and become significant favorites for the division crown. Sorry for usurping the Arenado thread.

[Bob Reed]

Thanks very much for doing all of that legwork, CJ. I was a little surprised to see Carlson so far ahead of the field — but as you noted, Harry Bader’s defense doesn’t get much credit from the KATOH projection model.

As a companion piece to your research, I checked the cumulative Davenport Mean projections for the next two years for a large cast of outfielders, pro-rating their seasons to 600 plate appearances each. Again, this is for the next two seasons with full playing time:

Harrison Bader 8.4 WAR
Randy Arozarena 8.2
Lane Thomas 6.8
Justin Williams 6.2
Marcell Ozuna 6.2
Nick Castellanos 6.2
Dylan Carlson 5.8
Tyler O’Neill 4.8
Dexter Fowler 3.9

Taking these numbers at face value, there’s obviously no way for the Cardinals at this snapshot in time to justify signing either Ozuna or Castellanos. Athough each of them has a very solid outlook, and would be a smart addition at small dollars for most any other organization.

And also bear in mind gentle readers that even if Arozerena is really this good (he probably isn’t), the dropoff to other Redbird flycatchers just isn’t that precipitous.

Lastly, if Dylan Carlson’s projection feels overly modest, remember he’s just turned 21. Davenport has him peaking at 4.7 WAR in the 2025 season. (Edit: Davenport tinkers with the numbers on a regular basis, and Carlson’s next two years have been downgraded to 5.4 WAR, but his single-season peak has been increased to 5.1 wins above replacement.)

[Bob Reed]

“Fill in the blank, Ryu kinda looks like a long blond haired ______________”

Macy’s parade balloon? Baby LeRoy? Hideki Irabu?

“For whatever reason, I thought Miller just looked a lot better than his stats showed.”

I can understand that. He was a very specific kind of bad pitcher in 2019. Could be very good for a couple of weeks at a time, or even more. But then terrible. Terribler than anyone else in the pen. Home runs at the worst of possible times, hit batters, free passes.

(Edit: Now that I look more closely, Miller’s year was even more schizo than I thought. Awful in April & September, but surprisingly [to me anyway] an ERA just a whisker under 3.00 from May through August.)

I think I was embittered by his April, then horrified by his September. So those months burned into my memory. Thus my biased brain wouldn’t fully acknowledge his solid four months in the middle. Of course, what all of this means for Miller’s 2020 season, nobody knows. All we can say for sure is that the killer Miller of 2014-17 no longer exists.

[Bob Reed]

Lots of good thoughts herein. Well done, gents.

As for how we define an “elite” ballclub, at the risk of being the lonely contrarian here, personally I’m most comfortable saying that anything at the 90th percentile or better qualifies as elite, rather than a specific threshold of wins per season. And in a 30-team competition, the 90th percentile means no more than 3 teams better than you — over a prolonged period of time, of course.

By that standard the Cardinals were elite in the 1960’s, finishing the decade with the 4th-most wins in the sport, trailing only the Orioles, Yankees, and Mays/McCovey/Marichal Giants.

Led by Whitey Herzog the Cards were elite again in the 1980’s, tying for the 4th-best record, behind the Royals, Yankees, and Tigers. (So, best in the Senior Circuit, obviously.)

In the 2000’s the Birds were 3rd in baseball, as only the Red Sox and (who else?) damn Yankees won more games. And finally, in the decade just completed the Cards finished 3rd in wins, trailing just the Yankees and Dodgers.

You may be wondering why I haven’t mentioned the number of wins the Cards averaged in any of those decades. Well, if 95 wins is the cutoff for “elite,” then the Cards haven’t had any elite decades, or even close. The 2000-2009 stretch saw the club average 91.3 wins, and that was the best Redbird decade since the unstoppable Southworth/Musial juggernauts of the 1940’s. (And by “best decade” I mean, that was the best of any ten-year stretch. Not just ten-year periods ending in a 9.)

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In short, 95 wins is a monster standard. To see how monster, I thought I’d do a bit of research on how often the Cards have had a sustained 95-win stretch. So here goes.

Longest period averaging 95+ wins since 1950? Six years with LaRussa, from 2000-2005, during which the team averaged 96 victories. Six years is fairly impressive, for sure. But the next-longest 95-win stretch during the last 70 years, for the most successful franchise in National League history, was a mere three seasons.

It happened twice, one time for the Red Schoendienst Cards (exactly 95 wins on average from 1967-69) and also the Matheny Cardinals of 2013-15, who won 96 games per year and led MLB twice in victories. (Do Matheny’s wins count, though? Because everyone knows he was incompetent, which must mean his wins were all luck and therefore he shouldn’t receive any credit.)

The best 3-year period under Hall Of Fame manager Whitey Herzog? Just 92 wins per year from 1985-87. In fact, here’s a surprising stat for the Whitey nostalgiasts out there. At 90 wins per year, the Cards averaged fewer wins during Herzog’s best 4-year stretch than the team has averaged over the past 20 seasons as a whole — the two decades being mildly lamented within this very thread. I loved Whitey and still love Whitey, as he unquestionably resuscitated the franchise. But now we have some context, to go with our sentimentality.

So I guess my short answer to your question, stl25, would be that I think the Cards can improve very slightly upon their numbers of the past 20 years, and lift that average to maybe 92 or 93 wins per year over the next decade. But the last few wins are the hardest, and I feel that 95+ is a bridge too far.

Oh, and as long as I’m playing the contrarian, one guy — even the greatest and most glamorous of superstars — is not nearly as important as a consistently strong overall development system. Just one sub-replacement level guy will negate a chunk of your superstar’s value. (And yes, I’m looking at Fowler circa 2018, and a whole junkyard of recent free agent relievers.) I really do want more stars, just like the rest of you guys, but even the best superduperstar can’t lift a team without good depth around him. Ask Mike Trout.

[Bob Reed]

“So that seems like O’neill will be in LF, Fowler is sadly in RF, and Bader vs Thomas vs Edman in CF?”

Maybe I’m overthinking it, ChiTown, but I think this deal was partly to make a clearer path for someone in particular. I’d lay even money the Cards announce a Marcell Ozuna signing within 48 hours. And I’ll hate it, regardless of the dollars or duration of the contract. But it won’t be quite as painful now, since they’ll be blocking one fewer outfielder.

In a vacuum, though, this is a fine trade for both teams. Cards deal from surplus to fill a true organizational need. (And no, it has nothing to do with Liberatore’s handedness. He’s an elite pitching prospect, that’s all that ever matters.) Devil Rays improve for the now at least, and maybe the later. Much will hinge on how well Liberatore develops; he’s got talent, no doubt about it. Wonder if the young Tampa catcher involved is Edgardo Rodriguez. Looked pretty promising based on his DSL season in 2018, before a lost 2019 season.

[Bob Reed]

“But, yes, when someone is caught, a common defense is that ‘everyone else is doing it, too.’ It never matters, though.”

The “everyone else is doing it” is one of the few statements that’s always a lie. But it is the World Champion Rationalization. Undefeated, never even been knocked down. It’s Marciano, Mosconi, and Bob Mathias rolled into one.

Cycling was dirty, thanks to people like Armstrong. Baseball was dirty, thanks to McGwire, Bonds, Clemens, et. al. And the Chicago cops were dirty during the days of Capone.

But not all ChiTown cops were dirty. Not all cyclists were injecting. And certainly not all baseball players chose the path of least resistance during the so-called “steroid era.”

I don’t mind beatin’ a dead horse so I’ll say it again. If Rob Manfred is at all serious about stopping electronic cheating in baseball — or at least containing it as much as is humanly possible — then lifetime banishment for the highest-up individual implicated within both the Astros and Red Sox is the sole course of action. Not just draft picks or fines or suspensions or symbolic vacated titles. Those are necessary, too, but not sufficient.

Permanent expulsion. Separate the head from the rest of the snake.

[Bob Reed]

“It’s a real shame that Jim Edmonds didn’t get any support at all in his time on the ballot, although Rolen probably has a bit stronger case.”

Edmonds v. Rolen, huh? Good question, stl25.

Since the Hall Of Fame existed for many decades before WAR valuations were ever calculated, I like to primarily use the four classic Bill James HOF yardsticks to evaluate Hall candidates rather than WAR. (Yeah, I’m a heretic. Sue me.) For those not versed in said yardsticks, please check out Baseball-Reference.com.

Black Ink Test
Neither Rolen nor Edmonds score a point here, as neither ever led their league in a batting, baserunning, or (of course) pitching category.

Gray Ink Test (144 points = average HOFer)
Rolen 27, Edmonds 60
Edmonds thrashes Rolen, but each of them falls far short, when it comes to ranking in league top 10’s.

Hall Of Fame Monitor (100 = likely HOFer)
Rolen 99, Edmonds 88
Both have decent arguments here, Rolen a bit stronger. Neither would embarrass the Hall with their presence.

Hall Of Fame Standards (50 = average HOFer)
Rolen 40, Edmonds 39
Fairly close in both cases, but certainly nothing persuasive in favor of either.

So we’re left with a commonplace conundrum. If you’re a “large Hall” guy, Rolen is in, and maybe Edmonds. If “small Hall,” clearly neither makes the grade.

[Author]

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